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GETIING THE WORD 
David Luban * 
THE WORD AND THE LAW. By Milner S. Ball. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. 210. $27.50. 
In the introduction to this interesting book, Milner Ball 1 describes 
himself as a "theologian[ ] closeted in law" (p. 2). The metaphor is 
apt. It connotes at least these five things: that theologians in the legal 
profession often keep their "predilections" (p. 2) hidden; that they do 
so because their predilections are regarded by dominant prejudice as 
shameful, bizarre, and incomprehensible; that this dominant prejudice 
is wholly wrong; that theology, like homosexuality, represents a mode 
of human existence that is as ancient and venerable as humanity itself; 
and that it is high time to come out of the closet. 
To American legal culture-in the courts, in law practice, and in 
the academy - theological incursions indeed arouse anxiety and an-
tagonism. They evoke stereotypes of superstition, muzzy-headedness, 
religious particularism, narrowminded appeals to natural law, and, no 
doubt, a threat to the separation of church and state. Indeed, lawyers 
may believe, in a kind of unarticulated and bogus syllogism, that theo-
logical thinking in the law violates the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution. 
One understandable motive for these views arises from our ten-
dency to identify theology with religion, and thus with some particular 
religion that by definition excludes all others. As we shall see, how-
ever, one of Ball's leading themes is that theology is not the same thing 
as religion; remarkably, Ball's own theology is skeptical of religion and 
downright hostile to exclusionary religious factionalism.2 Thus, Ball's 
theological rendering of the law is not a sectarian brief, but something 
different or rather, several things different. 
It is, first, an assertion that law is a moral achievement and not, 
therefore, at bottom a technology of governance. Holmes to the con-
trary, law must not be understood only from the bad man's point of 
view, or bathed in cynical acid. In his powerful final chapter, Ball 
flatly asserts that, to the extent law is rightly understood as an imper-
• Morton and Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research Scholar, 
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. B.A. 1970, University of Chicago; M.A. 1973, 
M.Phil. 1973, Ph.D. 1974, Yale. 
1. Hannan W. Caldwell Professor of Law, University of Georgia. 
2. P. 101. Ball's theology derives principally from that of Karl Barth. I am not competent to 
judge whether, or to what extent, Ball deviates from Barth's own theology. 
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sonal instrument of governance, it is, quite simply, identical to death. 
"Death is integral to American law," he writes (p. 136). Expanding 
on this theme, he castigates Felix Frankfurter's insistence that law is 
"not the application of merely personal standards but the impersonal 
standards of society which alone judges, as the organs of Law, are 
empowered to enforce,"3 responding: "In that statement, or so I ask 
you to consider, in that tum of mind, death takes textual form" (p. 
137). The field of social action that we call law is an arena in which 
God's Word may or may not be enacted; only law animated by the 
Word can be anything other than death. 
Ball's theology of law is, second, an essential step preparatory to 
thinking about ethics in law - "the kind of description that is neces-
sary to ethics and precedes it" (p. 100). As Ball explains this point: 
A book on ethics would be composed of an elaboration of ... stories and 
examples ... that are types of specific, episodic service of the neighbor, 
including service of the neighbor ... by remaking dehumanizing institu-
tions. These would be stories and examples of the Word taking form -
action that is the responsibility and choice of humans, but action that is 
responsive to and engendered by the Word .... In this book, I am at-
tempting a description of the environment of decision in a given field of 
activity: the Word active and present in the practice oflaw. [pp. 99-100] 
Third, and most important in the economy of the book, Ball's the-
ology offers him a vantage point for making sense of the lives and 
works of seven legal professionals, five of them lawyers, whose stories 
occupy two fifths of Ball's pages. The remarkable opening chapter, 
almost seventy pages long, in which Ball describes their seven prac-
tices, is the heart of the book. Ball's portraits are lovingly painted, and 
their subjects are lovingly chosen. In the order that Ball presents 
them, the subjects are: 
• Henry Schwarzschild, director of the ACLU's Capital Punishment 
Project; 
• John Rosenberg, founder and director of Appelred, eastern Ken-
tucky's federally funded legal services agency; 
• Margaret Taylor, a housing court judge in Manhattan, exceptional 
for her compassion and stubborn defense of the legal rights of indi-
gent tenants;4 
• David Harding, a Turtle Mountain Chippewa who is a tribal judge 
for the Bums Paiute Tribe and has been a tribal judge for various 
other Northwest tribes; 
• Tim Coulter, head of the Indian Law Resource Center; 
• Steve Wizner, director of Yale's clinical law program; and 
3. Francis v. Reswerber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
4. This is a genuinely unusual phenomenon in urban housing courts. See the recent study by 
my colleague Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). 
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• Carla Ingersoll, a law student in Wizner's program who represents 
homeless clients. 
Clearly, these are not a representative slice of the legal profession. 
All of them are poor people's or public interest lawyers - a point, as 
we shall see, of some theological importance for Ball. All of them are 
people of extraordinary competence, and most seem to be people of 
extraordinary energy as well. Ball presents all of them as doing the 
Lord's work - that, indeed, is Ball's explicit point about them. What 
moral we are to draw from such a remarkable group of people about 
law, or about lawyers, or about how one should live is not plain, and 
this is a question to which I shall return. Yet Ball structures the book 
as an attempt to develop theological categories for understanding these 
seven people; thus, the seven portraits he paints provide confirming or 
disconfirming data for the categories he develops. 
What, then, is Ball's theology? Ball warns his reader at the outset: 
I do not here make a linear argument or advance a set of propositions 
toward a conclusion designed to compel readers' assent by the force of 
its logic. I make an argument, but in the sense in which we talk about 
the argument of a ballet or poem. I try for a performance, for affect and 
understanding more than agreement. [pp. 1-2] 
Subsequently, he repeats his warning that he will abjure "hard-driving, 
irresistible arguments, for I covet your understanding more than your 
agreement" (p. 76). He is as good as his word and operates with a 
kind of bipolar exposition, alternating between clean, categorical, and 
dogmatic statements of his theological propositions, shorn of specula-
tive or abstract argument to support them, and readings of literary and 
Biblical texts in the light of those propositions. The theological pro-
positions are fairly easy to state, but summarizing them in a credo or 
catechism falsely suggests that the propositions, rather than the read-
ing performances, occupy center stage. Keeping this warning in mind, 
we may nevertheless proceed. 
Central to Ball's position is a distinction between religion and 
God's Word. "Religion is the attempt to know God" (p. 100). It is a 
set of practices, or investigations, or rituals that begin with what is 
human and attempt to bridge the chasm between the human and the 
divine. That, however, is impossible, for "[i]n the biblical stories God 
gives himself and makes himself known. This self-revelation does not 
correspond to religion, to human striving toward God" (p. 79). Like 
the Kantian thing-in-itself, God's Word, Ball twice tells us, is "incor-
respondent" (pp. 85, 86). It reaches and affects us solely and uniquely 
by the agency of God, while religion, the human effort to invoke the 
Word, "misdirects by deflecting the search for God back upon the 
self" (p. 84). In this way, "from the biblical perspective, religion is 
unbelief" (p. 81). That is because "God makes his own way to 
humans, and his self-revelation bears its own possibilities for being 
known or not known. Jacob's ladder extended from heaven to earth, 
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not the other way around" (p. 80). Religions try to launch the ladder 
to heaven, but, as the story of the tower of Babel signifies, the attempt 
exemplifies the sin of pride and ends in discord. 5 
Ball therefore cannot accept that "the present, active power of the 
Word should be restricted to performance in history only through 
faith, and then only through Christian faith" (p. 101). Manifestations 
of the Word are due entirely to God, not to the Christian religion. 
Christianity "cannot claim superiority over other religions; it can only 
claim solidarity with them" (p. 101). Sectarian Christians must re-
member that "Christian religion can only apply first to itself the judg-
ment that religion is unbelief" (p. 101). 
All this does not mean that religion is antithetical to the Word; 
Ball does not go so far as to identify religion with idolatry. Rather, 
religion can be "adopted by the Word" (p. 86). He illustrates his 
meaning through powerful readings of texts from William Faulkner's 
The Sound and the Fury and Toni Morrison's Beloved, in which reli-
gious services become occasions for genuine inspiration by the Word. 
In logical terms, Ball's view is this: Religion is not a sufficient condi-
tion for realizing the Word. Nor is it a necessary condition for realiz-
ing the Word. In his seven lawyer stories, Ball does not suggest that 
all of his practitioners are religious, though in his view their practices 
all manifest the Word in action. But religion is not inconsistent with 
the realization of the Word - even a religious service can be an occa-
sion for God's grace. This ironic way of putting the last point I think 
captures Ball's paradoxical view of religion. While many orthodox 
Christians believe that the Church is the sole path to salvation, Ball's 
view seems instead to be the doubly negatived proposition that the 
Church is not necessarily not the path to salvation. 
This does not mean that God chooses the site of salvation arbitrar-
ily, or even unpredictably. Ball twice quotes a passage from Karl 
Barth: "Almost to the point of prejudice - [God] ignored all those 
who are high and mighty and wealthy in the world in favour of the 
weak and meek and lowly."6 Ball comments that "[p]overty and self-
giving rather than power, wealth, and self-aggrandizement still consti-
tutes the likely sites for gathering evidence of the Word taking positive 
form" (p. 152). Hence, in his opening chapter, Ball focuses exclusively 
on legal practitioners who concern themselves with issues central to 
the lives of the poor, and who have elected to forego financially enrich-
ing practices of law. In this light it is significant that Ball's chosen 
passages from Faulkner and Morrison, which he takes to manifest the 
Word, both describe services in ministries by poor and suffering Afri-
5. But compare Richard Hyland, Babel: A She'ur, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585 (1990), for a 
fascinating and sympathetic interpretation of the Tower of Babel story and the multiplicity of 
languages consequent upon it. 
6. Pp. 99, 152 (quoting 4 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 168 (1958)). 
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can Americans. 7 The Word is unlikely to manifest itself in the midst 
of power and plenty. 
The next central point of Ball's theology concerns his use of the 
word Word. To put the point quickly, Ball gives it the sense of its 
Hebrew counterpart dabar rather than its Greek counterpart logos. 
The difference is this: 
Logos means that by which inward thought is expressed. But it also 
means the inward thought itself, and so could be translated into Latin as 
ratio, "reason." In the Greek tradition, logos bore the sense of rational-
ity and so made its way directly into the English language as "logic." 
The Hebrew for "word," dabar, has the sense of power: the word 
that accomplishes what it says, be it doom or redemption, interpretation 
or the foreclosure of interpretation. The Hebraic dabar is different from 
the Greek logos. Something of the difference may be captured this way: 
If I speak logically, I speak with correct reasoning; but if I speak 
dabarly, I speak with effective power. I would associate the Hebrew 
dabar with the Greek dunamis, which gives us the English words dyna-
mite and dynamics. [pp. 119-20] 
As Ball puts it elsewhere: "What is said is done" (p. 109); "[t]he word 
does what it says as God performs mighty acts" (p. 119). 
When the Word manifests itself, therefore, we are not to under-
stand that a communication has issued from God to man, nor are we 
to imagine an alteration of belief. Rather, we are to imagine a trans-
formation of the person herself, of her character, accomplished by the 
Word, that enables her to receive the Word or, alternatively, prevents 
her from receiving the Word. Ball's doctrine thus includes a robust 
concept of epistemological predestination: what we know or do not 
know of the Word depends on aspects of our selves that are literally 
out of our control and in the control of God. Recall two passages 
from Ball that I have already quoted: the Word "accomplishes what it 
says, be it ... interpretation or the foreclosure of interpretation"; God's 
"self-revelation bears its own possibilities for being known or not 
known" (pp. 119-20, emphasis added). 
Ball develops his doctrine of epistemological predestination rather 
fully in chapter four. There he expounds Mark 4:10-12: 
And when he was alone, those who were about him with the twelve 
asked concerning the parables. And he said to them, "To you has been 
given the secret of the kingdom of God, but for the others everything is 
in parables; in order that they may indeed see but not perceive, and may 
indeed hear but not understand; lest they should turn again, and be 
discharged. " 8 
7. Faulkner's scene describes a sermon in one of his protagonists' churches by the Reverend 
Shegog, a visiting preacher from St. Louis. Morrison's is a powerful scene in which Baby Suggs 
preaches through speech and dance. 
8. Pp. 106-07. I am quoting the translation from Ball's text; I am unsure which edition of 
the Bible he is using. 
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Ball interprets this passage in the light of the verses from Isaiah to 
which Jesus was alluding: 
And he said, "Go and say to this people: 
'Hear and hear, but do not understand; 
see and see, but do not perceive.' 
Make the heart of this people fat, 
and their ears heavy, 
and shut their eyes; 
lest they see with their eyes, 
and hear with their ears, 
and understand with their hearts, 
and turn and be healed."9 
As Ball points out, Isaiah responds with the question "How long, 0 
Lord?" and is met with the answer: "Until cities lie waste without 
inhabitant, and houses without men, and the land is utterly 
desolate."10 
Ball's interpretation of these passages is complex and learned in 
biblical scholarship. To a reader like me, who knows nothing of bibli-
cal scholarship, it is one of the most instructive parts of the book. The 
most important point of his interpretation for present purposes is that 
Ball unflinchingly accepts the exceedingly harsh plain meaning of 
these verses: that God's Word works to transform its hearers by delib-
erately making them worse - by hardening their hearts so that they 
cannot repent of their wicked ways and win forgiveness. God then 
punishes them for unrepented wicked deeds. This is a version of the 
familiar doctrine of moral predestination, and Ball is attuned to the 
"alienating effect on the modem reader's sense of fairness" (p. 116) it 
contains: "If hearts were hardened by the prophetic word commis-
sioned by God, so that repentance became impossible, who was the 
active, responsible party?" (pp. 115-16); on the next page he concedes 
that "the hardening of hearts that prevents repentance" is "violently 
perverse."11 Violently perverse or not, it is the reading of the Bible 
that Ball endorses. 
The transition from moral predestination to epistemological pre-
destination arises from Ball's reading of the Markan verses. In Ball's 
view, Jesus is not merely the messenger of the Kingdom of God, he is 
himself the message: "He is the Word given to the disciples" (p. 123). 
9. P. 108 (quoting Isaiah 6:9-10). 
10. P. 110 (quoting Isaiah 6:11). 
11. P. 117. Later, however, he offers what strikes me as merely verbal resolution to the 
problem, referring to "the coincidence of divine and human agency" as "a mystery." P. 122. To 
my ear, "mystery" connotes something that eludes rational explanation but is nevertheless possi-
ble, whereas the coincidence of divine and human agency seems logically impossible. Calling the 
coincidence of divine and human agency mysterious begs the question of whether it represents a 
coherent possibility. Ball, however, may be unfazed by this worry. At one point he asks, 
nonrhetorically, "Is God bound by arithmetic?" {p. 192 n.35), suggesting that in his view logical 
impossibility may not imply divine impossibility. 
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Thus, the secret given to the disciples is not a piece of esoteric infor-
mation; rather, it is Jesus himself. And Jesus' self-performing Word in 
the Markan verses effects a hardening of the hearts of outsiders -
ultimately including the disciples inasmuch as each subsequently be-
trays Jesus (p. 124) - so that they cannot accept the Word. Though 
these verses, like the verses from Isaiah, conclude in an inability to 
repent - moral predestination - the focus in the Markan verses lies 
primarily on the inability to see and hear - epistemological 
predestination. 
This theme ties in with Ball's method of argument and his reliance 
on narrative and literary analysis rather than on "hard-driving, irresis-
tible arguments." For Ball, an irresistible argument is largely beside 
the point. It can at most compel belief in a conclusion, but getting the 
Word is not believing in a conclusion; getting the Word depends, 
moreover, on divine grace rather than a human interlocutor's logical 
or dialectical skill. To believe that arguing toward "a conclusion 
designed to compel readers' assent by the force of its logic" can actu-
ally make a difference is to miss the point of epistemological predesti-
nation. God's power will compel or block the reader's assent by acting 
on her character, regardless of the force of logic. Like religion, which 
"misdirects by deflecting the search for God back upon the self" (p. 
84), logical argument is an exercise in hubris, a misguided effort at self-
transcendence that is ultimately a form of unbelief. 
One might respond that epistemological predestination renders all 
forms of argument beside the point, Ball's included. I am unsure 
whether he would disagree with this response. Instead, the answer his 
book implies is that works of art and literature, such as those that he 
analyzes and writes, are more likely to be "adopted by the Word" than 
are linear arguments. He proposes that "aesthetic meaning - the un-
derstanding that occurs between reader and narrative - is a secular 
parable" (p. 129). Or, in an equally subtle aphorism, "[a]esthetic 
meaning is underwritten by the risk God takes with us" (p. 131 ). In 
works of literature, God offers us an opportunity. In support of this 
thought, Ball points out that the reader's participation is a necessary 
component of literary meaning, for without the reader a work of liter-
ature is nothing but "marks on a page," or "a string of letters" (p. 
131). Thus, "[l]iterary texts are invitational. They cannot be more. 
They do not compel us to open their covers or to give them a good 
reading" (p. 132). Linear arguments, by contrast, are "coercive" (p. 
142). 
I do not find this argument especially persuasive, for each of Ball's 
points holds for any book, not only works of literature. Without a 
reader, even the most "linearly" argued technical logic treatise is noth-
ing but "marks on a page," and the logic book cannot compel us to 
open its covers any more than can the literary text. Yet much of Ball's 
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self-understanding rests on the distinction that he draws between "co-
ercive," therefore deadening, works of linear argumentation and in-
spirited, dialogical works of literature. 12 Perhaps the distinction is 
there to be drawn, but Ball's stated grounds for drawing it are 
inadequate. 
This point is important because the book's final chapter, "Morbid-
ity and Viability in Law," makes crucial use of the distinction. I have 
already quoted his opinion that "[d]eath is integral to American law" 
(p. 136), and it is an opinion that I have not wrenched out of context. 
Ball's chapter opens with a scathing denunciation of law, legality, and 
legal texts as a vast realm of living death, death that "intrudes upon 
our lives before the end" (p. 136). The opening sentences of the chap-
ter are well worth quoting: 
Law locks up deals and people and wants to leave no openings . . . . 
George Steiner suggests that remembrance safeguards the core of our 
individuality; what we commit to memory - the poem, the image, the 
musical score - "is the ballast of the self." I have not seen the contract, 
statute, brief, or judicial opinion that I should want to memorize. The 
legal texts are deadening rather than stabilizing and are best not had by 
heart. [p. 136] 
Later he adds: 
Death is to be read, too, in leases, deeds, and contracts. Just as some 
people spread their butter all the way to the edges of a slice of bread, so 
do lawyers draft all the way to the edges of the permissible. If there is 
not enough space on the page, we use fine print. We want everything 
covered. [p. 139] 
He illustrates by referring to the Clean Air Act, "the benumbing prod-
uct of frequent, wholesale amendment, vast political maneuvering, and 
little clarity. It is massive. And none of it can be set to music" (p. 
139). 
One's first impulse is to suspect Ball of harboring skewed expecta-
tions of the text of the Clean Air Act. Many good and useful books 
are "best not had by heart" and cannot be set to music. The telephone 
book, for example, does nothing to nourish the soul, but it is an excel-
lent place to find telephone numbers. The Clean Air Act, likewise, 
does not express our love of nature as Wordsworth does: 
My heart leaps up when I behold 
A rainbow in the sky: 
So was it when my life began; 
So is it now I am a man; 
12. I, for one, cannot accept that works of rigorous argumentation are any more deadening, 
and any less appropriate vehicles for divinity, than works of literature. I think, for example, of 
the mathematician Paul Erdos, who would describe a particularly beautiful and penetrating 
mathematical proof, only somewhat wryly, as "one from the Book." Very few proofs are "from 
the Book" - only a proof that combines great beauty with revelatory insight into mathematical 
objects wrests that title from Erdos. It is another way of saying that a mathematical proof can be 
adopted by the Word, and I do not think it idolatrous. 
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So be it when I shall grow old, 
Or let me die!13 
1255 
But Wordsworth will be of little help to an automotive engineer trying 
to decide what level of fuel efficiency to try to achieve. 
I think there is something to this criticism, for Ball's diatribe 
against the law seems to me redolent of romantic railings against the 
complexity of modem life and politics - rather like Wagner's contrast 
in the Ring between the stultifying power of contracts and the redemp-
tive power of innocent human love. Surely, the critic may say, it is 
time to move beyond these romantic oppositions. 
This criticism misses Ball's theological point, however. The latter 
is best understood through the distinction we have been examining 
between "invitational" works of literature, which are open-ended and 
dialogical and serve like parables as vehicles for the Word, and legal 
texts which "want[ ] to leave no openings" (p. 136) In Ball's words: 
When we open a copy of The Sound and the Fury, or Beloved or King 
Lear, the marks on their pages prompt us to engage in ... creation .... 
But open a copy of the statutes of a state or of the federal government, or 
unfold an insurance policy or a deed, and marks on their pages, I think, 
prompt a different response. 
Legal texts appear to discourage otherness and creative responsibil-
ity. Lawyers' language seems fortresslike and impermeable to transcen-
dence. This is so because such writing is done and received on a wager 
of the absence of God, not His presence. [p. 140] 
Ball's criticism of legal language, we now see, is not that it is tedious 
or turgid, but that, by aiming to eliminate all surprises and all open-
ness to contingency, it is at once an assault on freedom and a display 
of faithlessness. 14 Later Ball connects these violent denunciations with 
academic argument forms. "The presently dominant form of legal ar-
gument in the academy is that of social science. It is linear and coer-
cive. It strings together propositions that lead to a conclusion that 
must be either accepted or rejected . . . . It is the form death takes in 
academic legal discourse" (p. 142). Noteworthy in this passage is the 
connection of linear discourse with coercion, a connection implicit as 
well in passages I have quoted earlier. Linear argument aims to com-
pel, not to invite; it means to foreclose possibilities rather than create 
them. That is why it is a form of death, the final forecloser of 
possibilities. 
These and similar observations lead Ball to find whatever hope 
there can be in law outside of legal texts. He finds it, in fact, in the 
lives of the seven practitioners he introduced in Chapter One - Chris-
tian lawyers, in Ball's version of Christianity, notwithstanding the fact 
13. William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up When I Behold, in SIX CENTURIES OF GREAT 
POETRY 341 (Robert Penn Warren & Albert Erskine eds., 1955). 
14. See Ball's discussion of faith. P. 100. 
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that most of them are not Christians. Their efforts on behalf of the 
poor, their attempts to build community, and their professionalism all 
bespeak law that has been adopted by the Word. Thus, the book cir-
cles back to the lives with which it began. 
Though The Word and the Law is in many ways a deep and admi-
rable book, I find myself disquieted both by much of what Ball says 
and by how he says it. 
Let me propose, as a first point, that Ball's view is radically incom-
patible with the very possibility of religious epistemology. There is no 
place in his system for asking how one tests the authenticity of revela-
tion, or, for that matter, how one justifies a theology whose central 
concept is the incorrespondent Word. These are really two sides of the 
same problem. If the Word is truly incorrespondent, how does one 
come to know that fact about it or, for that matter, any other theologi-
cal proposition? Ball's answer seems to be that the Word will make 
itself known. Dabar will act upon us and exalt us. 
But, as every skilled propagandist knows, many things act upon us 
and exalt us, though they do not come from God. Hitler's Nazi rallies 
at Nuremberg, with Albert Speer's "cathedral of light" effect achieved 
by shining searchlights directly upward on the bottoms of clouds, ex-
alted the rallying masses, as is plain to viewers of Leni Riefenstahl's 
documentary The Triumph of the Will Music, rhythmic chanting, 
and mob sentiment can all be manipulated to exalt an audience and 
instill a sense of revelatory certitude. A former Moonie told me how 
enforced sleep deprivation, fasting, collective rituals, authoritarian su-
pervision, and a practice of "bombing with love" (group hugging and 
so forth) filled him with a sense of community and of the imminent 
numinous. 
There is a theological category in which these examples fall: it is 
the category of temptations. And the problem of religious epistemol-
ogy is how to distinguish the authentic Word from the temptations 
that mimic its effects. Ball offers no solution to this problem, and epis-
temological predestination makes it unclear whether there could be a 
solution. God will open our eyes and ears, or close them, at His suffer-
ance. To suppose that any human effort to distinguish truth from 
temptation could succeed is to commit the same fallacy as religion 
does. To rely on human effort rather than divine action is tantamount 
to unbelief. 
The problem of religious epistemology reflects itself in the struc-
ture of Ball's argument, which I have described as alternation between 
dogmatic, because unargued, assertions of his central theological pro-
positions and "performances" of literary and biblical texts that are to 
bear the burden of persuasion. The question is this: How are his read-
ings of The Sound and the Fury and of Beloved supposed to exemplify 
the power of the Word? Both of them are beautiful and inspiring 
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works of art; the scenes on which Ball focuses - scenes of ministry 
and revelation - depict authentic, saving, inspiring acts of the Word. 
However, precisely because these books are works of art - of arti-
fice - the problem of distinguishing truth from temptation does not 
arise. It does not arise because the artist has taken care of the problem 
for us. We know that the Reverend Shegog's preaching and Baby 
Suggs' dancing represent the authentic power of the Word because 
Faulkner and Morrison have composed their stories to make that 
truth manifest. Things are not so plain in actual life, every instant of 
which is fraught with ambiguity. 
As Nietzsche argued, art can deceive. He came to appreciate the 
gravity of the problem when Wagner composed Parsifal, an opera that 
contains some of the most compelling music ever written, but whose 
Christian message was totally antithetical to the equally compelling 
message of the Ring. Nietzsche came to understand that, one way or 
another, he had been had. 15 Ball's theory of aesthetic meaning at-
tempts to obviate this problem but in the end merely restates it. "Aes-
thetic meaning is underwritten by the risk God takes with us" (p. 131). 
How do we know? Ball's answer seems to be that if you need to ask 
the question, you have missed the point, betrayed the wager that God 
made by adopting the work of art. Ball's position suggests, moreover, 
that this was your destiny, that God has hardened your heart so that 
you had to betray that wager. But how do we know any of that? At 
this point, Ball can do little more than repeat that if you need to ask 
the question, you have missed the point. 
Perhaps this is why he insists that he is interested in understand-
ing, not in agreement. His explicit disowning of rationalist ambition 
- the offering of evidence and justification for what he says - reflects 
itself in the fact that he explicitly disowns truth-claims. When he calls 
his argument a performance, the implication is that it cannot be called 
"true" or "false." 
This brings me to my second source of disquiet. Ball repeatedly 
contrasts his own "invitational" way of proceeding with the coercive 
nature of linear argument. But disowning a truth-claim is in its own 
way just as coercive as logical argumentation, because it offers the in-
terlocutor no space to register difference. What Ball says about social-
scientific argument seems equally true of exposition that offers no 
truth-claim: "It strings together propositions that lead to a conclusion 
that must be either accepted or rejected" (p. 142). To be interested in 
the reader's understanding rather than her agreement (p. 76) sounds 
15. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, The Case of Wagner, in THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE 
CASE OF WAGNER (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1967) (1888); THE NIETZSCHE-
WAGNER CORRESPONDENCE 285-312 (Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche ed. & Caroline v. Kerr 
trans., Liveright Publishing Corp. 1921). 
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noncoercive, but it also signals a kind of immovability: unlike under-
standing, agreement can be achieved only through give and take. 
On the other side, it is unclear that the social scientific argumenta-
tion that Ball excoriates is "coercive" (p. 142). When it is well done, 
social science consists in the patient gathering and ordering of facts 
about society that are in doubt or not well known. I would point to 
the work of scholars such as Marc Galanter, Herbert Kritzer, and 
other law-and-society researchers as cases in point. 16 The presentation 
of facts is coercive only in the sense that, once one has been presented 
with persuasive evidence, one must accommodate this evidence some-
how. To do otherwise is simply to disrespect the external world. 
The same is true of linear argumentation. Consider one of the 
most beautiful mathematical theorems, Euclid's proof that the number 
of primes is infinite. The proof is simple and elegant. Suppose that 
there were only a finite number of primes, and that N is the largest 
prime. Form a new integer M by multiplying all the primes together 
and adding 1. M is not divisible by any of the primes up to N because 
it has been constructed so that dividing M by any of these primes 
leaves a remainder of 1. Nor can M be divisible by any prime larger 
than N, for N was supposed to have been the largest prime. Thus M 
must itself be prime. M is a prime larger than N, the largest prime. 
We have a contradiction. Hence there cannot be a largest prime. 
Hence the primes are infinite in number.17 
This "linear" proof is "coercive" only in the sense that, once I 
have understood it, I can deny its conclusion only by sheer willfulness. 
Doing so would be tantamount to denying that anything outside my 
own self can exercise a claim on me. Denying the proof is, to para-
phrase Ball's characterization of religion, a form of unbelief. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes once referred to his "secret fountain of faith ... the 
belief that I am in the universe, not it in me .... "18 Denying the proof 
is tantamount to believing that the universe is in me, and not that I am 
in the universe. The proof thus offers me the opportunity to display 
respect for the world outside my own wishes. Call such respect 
humility. Alternatively, I can insist that nothing can change my mind. 
Call this insistence pride. What Ball regards as being coerced by linear 
argument is in my view nothing other than resisting a temptation to 
16. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1990); Herbert M. 
Kritzer, LET'S MAKE A DEAL (1991); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What 
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious 
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943 (1992); David M. Trubeck et al., The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 
UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983). 
17. Book 9, Proposition 20, in 2 Eucuo, THE THIRTEEN BOOKS OF THE ELEMENTS 
(Thomas C. Heath trans., 2d ed. 1956). 
18. Holmes to Baroness Moncheur, December 30, 1915, quoted in SHELDON M. NOVICK, 
HONORABLE JUSTICE 319 (1989). 
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the sin of pride. Coercion by linear argument or social scientific fact 
is, in fact, no different from that experienced by Jeremiah, in a passage 
quoted approvingly by Ball: 
If I say, "I will not mention him, 
or speak any more in his name," 
there is in my heart as it were a burning fire 
shut up in my bones, 
and I am weary with holding it in, 
and I cannot.19 
Ball explains: "It is impossible not to prophesy. When God utters his 
word, prophetic speech . . . is one of the possible, irresistible conse-
quences" (p. 118). Likewise, in the face of fact or proof, belief is one 
of the possible, irresistible consequences. 
Clearly, disagreeing with Ball about the coercive character of so-
cial-scientific or logical argument will affect one's assessment of Ball's 
extraordinary hostility to legal scholarship, as well as to law itself. I 
am simply unable to go along with Ball that "[t]he presently dominant 
form of legal argument in the academy ... is the form death takes in 
academic legal discourse" (p. 142). 
On the other hand, I do agree with Ball that narrative forms of 
explanation, particularly those giving pride of place to excluded 
voices, must take primacy over causal laws in legal argument as well 
as social science. The reason, however, concerns the nature of social 
explanation rather than the moral inadequacy of linear argument. 
Causal explanations are standpoint- and purpose-relative. A surge 
of electricity through a wire will not cause it to ignite unless oxygen is 
present, so in one sense the presence of oxygen has just as much a 
claim as the surge of electricity to be the cause of the wire's igniting. 
The electricity, like the oxygen and other factors such as the wire's 
conductivity, are contributing conditions of the wire igniting. Ordina-
rily, however, we would say that it was the electricity, not the oxygen, 
that caused the wire to ignite: if, in answer to the question "What 
made that wire burn up?," someone replied "The air did it," we would 
treat the reply as a wisecrack. All contributing conditions are created 
equal, but for practical explanatory purposes we must inevitably dis-
tinguish background conditions (such as the presence of oxygen) from 
foreground conditions, such as the surge of electricity.20 The ones in 
which we are interested move to the foreground, and precisely these 
we dignify by calling them causes of events. 
It should be clear that the distinction between foreground and 
background conditions is not a part of nature, but rather what is now-
adays called a "social construction." Change our explanatory interest 
19. P. 118 (citing Jeremiah 20:9). 
20. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION AND THE LAW 34-35 (2d ed. 1985); see 
also J.L. Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 245 (1965). 
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and the distinction might be drawn differently, leading us to call a 
different contributing condition of the event its cause. If, for example, 
we are trying to explain why a leaky lightbulb burned out, we would 
say that it was the oxygen in the bulb that caused it to bum out. We 
would not say, except as a joke, that the lightbulb burned out because 
someone turned on the electricity. In this example, our explanatory 
purposes make the oxygen a foreground condition and the surge of 
electricity a background condition - the diametrical opposite of our 
usual explanatory priority. 
We are now in a position to see why causal explanations of com-
plex human events are inadequate. Though we can sometimes agree 
on the contributing conditions leading to an event, the choice of which 
of those conditions belongs in the explanatory foreground and which 
belong in the background is apt to be controversial. It is, in fact, pre-
cisely what the disagreement is about. From the point of view of dif-
ferent groups, or sometimes different individuals within a group, the 
events that concern salient features of their experience are the fore-
ground events, whereas those irrelevant to that experience belong in 
the background. If we must decide among competing explanations, 
we will do so on the basis of narratives that are more performatively 
persuasive than their competitors. That is why narrative, rather than 
social-scientific causal argument, is the primary instrument of authen-
tic understanding in law.21 But this primacy of narrative within his-
torical and legal explanation has nothing to do with the deadening 
character of social-scientific argument.22 Where Ball opposes narra-
tive performance to rational argument, I suggest that narrative per-
formance is the form that rational argument takes in law. When one is 
used to the narratives of dominant social groups, the need to hear and 
respond to the stories of previously excluded voices becomes an episte-
mological imperative. For the same reason, I do not share Ball's rather 
passionate sense of the law's all-pervasive awfulness. That awfulness 
stems, recall, from the fact that "[l]aw locks up deals and people and 
wants to leave no openings" (p. 136). While poetry, art, and music are 
21. For further development of these themes, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 
(forthcoming), particularly the introduction and chapters four and five. 
22. Indeed, abstract argument is often an essential antidote to the seduction of our under-
standing by a narrative that overemphasizes certain features of cases at the expense of others. As 
Robin West has noted, appeal to narrative at the expense of arguments about rights has become a 
favorite strategy of proponents of the death penalty. By stressing the gory details of a murder, 
they are able to press concern for the circumstances that led to the murder, as well as the circum-
stances under which the defendant was convicted, into the background. Robin West, Narrative, 
Responsibility and Death: A Comment On The Death Penalty Cases From the 1989 Term, 1 Mo. 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (1990); see also Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsi· 
bility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245 (1992) (arguing that our determination to 
blame criminals for their behavior notwithstanding such contributing causes as their addiction or 
intoxication falsely isolates their deeds from the surrounding contributing conditions that, from a 
medical rather than punitive point of view, constitute the true foreground conditions - hence 
causes - of the wrongful behavior). 
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vehicles of transcendence (p. 140), "[l]awyers' language seems for-
tresslike and impermeable to transcendence . . . . As though God were 
dead. It is assumed that there is no real presence to reinsure meaning, 
so everything has to be set out on the page" (p. 140). That is why 
"[l]egal texts appear to discourage otherness and creative responsibil-
ity" (p. 140). 
Yet human spontaneity can be destructive as well as creative, mali-
cious or exploitative as well as responsible. Ball understands this. In 
the paragraph immediately following the damning criticisms I have 
just quoted, he writes in objection to his arguments: 
Do we not want a Bill of Rights and a Clean Air Act with teeth and bite 
rather than poetry? A close friend of mine, a fine lawyer, represents a 
musical group. Negotiations with a recording company, covering every 
contingency, produced a document of eighty-nine close pages. Both 
sides wanted music, but they were right not to want it in their contract. 
[p. 140] 
The point is stronger than Ball suggests, however. Without the con-
tract there might be no music. Indeed, the music industry is notorious 
for managers and record companies who swindle artists whose busi-
ness acumen does not match their musicality. The eighty-nine-page 
contract does not "lock up" the musical group by sewing up every 
contingency - on the contrary, it frees the group from a host of wor-
ries and enables the musicians to make music. As Stephen Holmes has 
written, there are a lot worse things people can inflict on each other 
than stable expectations. 23 If everything is open, everything possible, 
everything on the agenda all the time, we will be unable to shake free 
of permanent distraction to devote ourselves wholly to things that 
matter. It is only an apparent paradox that legal documents that lock 
up contingencies can enhance, not impede, creative responsibility. 
Nor does it strike me as a sign of morbidity that the Clean Air Act 
is the product of "frequent, wholesale amendment, vast political ma-
neuvering, and little clarity" (p. 139). These features of the Act reflect 
the fact that it was produced by many hands, by the negotiation and 
compromise of many interests, rather than by a. single author. That is 
the sign of democratic dialogue - predictably corrupt, conspicuously 
venal, disgracefully biased, inconceivably vulgar, but not the mere ipse 
dixit of a Hobbesian sovereign. Solitary authors can produce laws of 
greater clarity, but only when they assume autocratic power. The 
complexity of the Clean Air Act is like the complexity of a medieval 
cathedral, constructed over generations, part Romanesque and part 
Gothic, its architectural vision blemished by the whims of errant bish-
ops, refracted through changing styles, dissipated by the work of 
stonewrights and artisans who apprenticed in a dozen regional 
23. Stephen Holmes, The Professor of Smashing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 19, 1987, at 30 
(reviewing ROBERTO UNGER, PoLmcs, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987)). 
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schools, and spoiled by ambitious additions that there was not enough 
money to complete. The cathedral's inconsistencies are a visible token 
of its history and the history of its community. To wish for greater 
unity of vision and purer beauty is to dismiss the cathedral's role in the 
community's life. The Clean Air Act is the opposite of what Ball calls 
it: "a bureaucratic voice from on high" (p. 139). Its voice is bureau-
cratic, to be sure - it is, after all, legislation of technological minutiae 
- but it would be a "voice from on high" only if it were not the 
product of "vast political maneuvering." 
By no means do I intend these remarks as an apology for Ameri-
can law, which is shot through with injustices and irrationalities. My 
point is that whatever critique we level at American law should focus 
on its substance, on specific callous decisions, unjust institutions, and 
oppressive practices, not on "legal texts" as a general category, or law 
as such. 
These doubts about Ball's critique lead me finally to wonder, if 
only a bit, at his remedy. It appears that precisely because there is so 
little in American law that he finds "viable,'' to use his own word, the 
only lawyers he can offer as a last bulwark against morbidity are law-
yers who in many ways verge on saintliness. Please do not misunder-
stand: I agree entirely that the public interest practitioners Ball 
depicts in his first chapter are the soul and conscience of legal practice. 
Without them and their kind there would be little excuse for the legal 
profession, and none whatever for the laws that would inundate their 
clients without their unremitting efforts. For this reason, I believe that 
every lawyer should devote a significant portion of her time to poor 
people's and public interest representation.24 But Ball, through his 
omnidirectional denunciation of conventional legal practice and his re-
iterated theological argument that the Word will manifest itself 
predominantly among the poor and lowly, seems to imply that only 
legal practices like his seven examples are morally endurable. Like 
Rubens' Fall of the Damned Into Hell, Ball's theology seems to con-
sign the multitude of legal practitioners to the realm of living death. 
In his seven examples, two themes repeatedly recur. First, virtu-
ally all of his seven lawyers have confronted the question of whether 
participation in the legal system in itself implies morally unacceptable 
co-optation. Henry Schwarzschild, at the chapter's opening, proposes 
as a thought experiment that a death penalty lawyer might walk out of 
the courtroom in midtrial as a protest against capital punishment (p. 
7). Later, he recollects that at one point he considered lying about his 
beliefs in order to be able to vote for acquittal as a juror in capital 
cases; he did not lie (p. 11). John Rosenberg, by contrast, elected to 
remain in the Nixon-Mitchell Justice Department out of concern for 
24. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusnCE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 169-73, 277-89, 381-91 
(1988). 
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the kind of lawyer who would likely replace him (p. 21). Margaret 
Taylor worries that her participation in Housing Court lends it legiti-
macy that it does not deserve (p. 37). David Harding fatally under-
mined his own judicial authority by refusing to be co-opted by 
showing favoritism to the niece of the Tribal Council chairman (p. 48). 
Ball himself reflects on "troublesome questions about gaining prestige 
and power within an alien system" (p. 72), and he reflects that "John, 
Margaret, Steve, David, Carla, Tim - and Henry, too - cannot 
avoid being 'officers of the system' after all" (p. 160). 
Parallel to this theme - the question of whether a decent lawyer is 
morally permitted to move any distance from herself into "the sys-
tem" - we find the repeated joy Ball's practitioners take in the unity 
of their work and their beliefs. "It is satisfying," says Rosenberg's 
wife, "when there is not a difference between your principles and your 
work" (p. 22). Margaret Taylor abandoned corporate law because 
"[t]here was a difference between my clients and my beliefs" (p. 34). 
David Harding "distinguishes his approach from that of the white tri-
bal attorney, who, he says, 'divided law from his life and commu-
nity' " (p. 45). Wizner and Ingersoll "talk about the disjunction 
between what many lawyers do and what they care most about in life" 
(p. 70). 
Clearly, these concerns are variations on the theme of moral au-
thenticity. Yet it seems obvious that most lawyers, for a significant 
portion of their time, will confront work that is not on an exalted 
plane, that is morally indifferent - though I am not suggesting that 
lawyers should engage in work that they think is morally wrong -
work such as going over the lease of a shopping mall shoe store. Pre-
sumably, there is often a difference between such a lawyer's principles 
and her work. Is this lawyer debarred from the life of the Word? 
In one of his most inspired pieces of theological writing, S¢ren 
Kierkegaard considers the plight of a Christian contemplating a recre-
ational outing to the Deer Park.25 He has come from a Sunday ser-
mon in which the pastor has insisted on a life of divine dedication, not 
merely during the hour of church on Sunday, but every moment of the 
week as well. This dedication, the pastor has made clear, is the true 
meaning of faith, for man can do nothing by himself, nothing without 
God. This being so, Kierkegaard asks, how can our Christian even 
consider anything so frivolous as an outing to the Deer Park? 
Gradually, ironically, Kierkegaard brings us to see that it is the 
pastor, with his half-hollow oratory, who is the truly frivolous one. To 
be a Christian, a "knight of faith," does not mean to do great deeds, to 
achieve the Holy Grail, or to seek the cloister. 
Our religious individual chooses the way to the Deer Park, and why? 
25. S_0REN KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT 422-45 (David F. 
Swenson & Walter Lowrie trans., 1941). 
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Because he does not dare to choose the way to the cloister. And why 
does he not dare? Because it is too high-flown. So then he takes the 
outing. "But he does not enjoy himself", someone will say. Oh yes, he 
certainly does. And why does he enjoy himself? Because it is the hum-
blest expression for his God-relationship to admit his humanity, and be-
cause it is human to enjoy oneself. 26 
Here, as elsewhere in his authorship, Kierkegaard insists that the leap 
of faith need not be signified by external acts of renunciation, and, 
indeed, that those who aim to demonstrate their faith through renun-
ciation have committed a kind of category mistake. In Fear and 
Trembling, Kierkegaard imagines someone eager to meet a genuine 
knight of faith, who expresses disappointment upon actually encoun-
tering him because in exterior demeanor the knight of faith is indistin-
guishable from a tax collector.27 
Now I am surely not suggesting that the seven lawyers Ball depicts 
have chosen the way of the cloister. Quite the contrary - as Ball 
depicts them, they are filled with an irrepressibly exuberant love of 
life. Nor do I mean to give uncritical endorsement to Kierkegaard's 
drastic disidentification of faith with any exterior signs. That way of 
thinking is, I suspect, peculiar to a strain of northern Protestantism -
the same strain that yielded Kant's insistence that moral goodness 
means good will rather than good action. In my own Jewish tradition 
there is no place for a purely interior faith; the emphasis lies entirely 
on deeds, and in this respect Ball's theology comes closer to Judaism 
than to Kierkegaard's Protestantism. 
My point in invoking Kierkegaard's dilemma of the Deer Park is 
merely to suggest that holding every lawyer to the high standard of 
devotion and energy set by the seven practices Ball eulogizes may be 
theologically too literal-minded. Kierkegaard's point is not to make 
the requirements of faith less demanding. On the contrary, the reign-
ing theme of Kierkegaard's argument is that genuine faith is impossi-
bly and incomprehensibly more demanding than conventional 
Christendom makes it out to be. His point is rather that the "leap of 
faith" does not necessarily manifest itself in a heightened devotion to 
moral duty. Indeed, Kierkegaard takes the story of Abraham and 
Isaac to show that ethics and faith - human duty and duty to God -
occupy different categories of existence. 
This argument is very close in spirit to Ball's own insistence on the 
radical incommensurability of religion and God's Word, of the human 
and the divine. Why, then, does Ball hold back from the conclusion 
that holiness may manifest itself in unsuspected and unpromising ves-
sels? Perhaps the hundreds of thousands of lawyers whose practices 
26. Id. at 440-41. 
27. Sj!)REN KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling, in FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICK-
NESS UNTO DEATH 21, 49 (Walter Lowrie trans., 1954). 
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are not like these seven may nonetheless escape the stem judgment 
that their professional careers amount to nothing more than death that 
"intrudes upon our lives before the end" (p. 136). After all, even the 
seven individuals Ball writes about found that they could not go 
through life without compromise. Unalienated labor is not a luxury 
available to all of us, and even a life containing more compromises and 
fewer good deeds than these seven may yet be adopted by an incor-
respondent Word. 
